CHART FROM:

An Introductory Exploration of Five Broad New Ideas on How to Cut Through the Access to Justice-Commercialization-Deregulation Conundrum

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In editing process for 2016 Symposium Issue of
GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS

| Requirement | Deregulation of nonprofits, with competitive grants | Limited Deregulation, Sliding Fees and Tax incentives | Continued Bar-based regulation, bar responsible for access, lawyer taxing by bar | Internalizing all access costs into the court system | National Safe Harbor for Technology Delivered Services, Free for Poor | Comparison of assessment of this requirement for all solutions |
|-----------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Serves All? | Only with sufficient resources, not inherent to model | Not certain, but likely, particularly if incentives adjustable | Yes, provided eligibility set appropriately. | Subject to details of system established | Only simpler solutions within the limited license. | Bar responsibility and tax incentives models appear to have greatest chance of success |
| Provides Sufficient Resources? | Not inherent in model | Yes, unless incentives were not politically sustainable. | Yes, unless politics intrudes. | A major area of uncertainty. | Likely for the limited services, given potential for efficiencies. | Bar and tax benefits systems offer best chance by far. Non- profit deregulation unlikely enough. |
| Efficient? | High | Dependent upon extent of regulatory changes. | Depends on details. | Opportunities, but depends on politics within the institutions, | Very high | Nonprofit might be most likely to be efficient, because of full deregulation in safe environment. |
| Varied Services, Matched to Need? | Somewhat, lack of court integration has risks in this area. | Deregulation should encourage. | Yes, strong incentives | Depends on institutions. Triage should be much easier. | Incomplete range of services, with effective triage | Most likely in bar and court- internalized solutions, with triage easiest in court internalized solution. |
| Incentivizes Changes in all Parts of the System? | Likely with the bar, possibility with the courts. | Lack of court integration may offer limits in this area. | Depends on court involvement. | Very high chance of cross maximized change. | Should put major efficiency pressures on other segments | Most likely with court-internalized solution. Additional risk solutions. |
| Consumer Protection Risks? | Little change likely | Some potential risk from nonlawyer services | Little likely change | Risk from removal of role distinctions between court and legal aid. | Higher risk. Perhaps monitoring algorithms could control the risk. | Some risk from nonlawyer services in some models. Lowest in nonprofit dereg. Court-internalized may have additional. |
| Avoids additional general non- neutrality? | Little risk | Little if any risk | Risk of lawyers interests producing non- neutrality. | Risk of less neutrality from court- legal aid integration | Important that monopoly and oligopoly be restricted by license process | Little risk, except possibly from court- internalized. |
| Summary of Assessment of Each Solution | Significant increase in access. Full 100% would require additional resources. Low risk. | 1. High chance of 100% access, provided regulatory changes permit efficiencies. | High change of success provided players willing to adopt the bargain. Court involvement needed. | Big increase in access. Full 100% would require additional resources, could be raised from within this system. Neutrality risks | 1.Not all services. 2. Significant reduction in costs, increase in efficiency, and change incentives. 3. Higher consumer protection risks. | Depends on estimates of politics with both lower case and capital "P". |